Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria by Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein (arXiv)For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.
Suggested by In Game Theory, No Clear Path to Equilibrium by Erica Klarreich (Quanta Magazine)

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Author: Chris Aldrich

I'm a biomedical and electrical engineer with interests in information theory, complexity, evolution, genetics, signal processing, theoretical mathematics, and big history.

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