🔖 Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies by Robert J. Aumann | Journal of Mathematical Economics

Bookmarked Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies (Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974) 67-96. North-Holland Publishing Company)

(.pdf download) Subjectivity and correlation, though formally related, are conceptually distinct and independent issues. We start by discussing subjectivity. A mixed strategy in a game involves the selection of a pure strategy by means of a random device. It has usually been assumed that the random device is a coin flip, the spin of a roulette wheel, or something similar; in brief, an ‘objective’ device, one for which everybody agrees on the numerical values of the probabilities involved. Rather oddly, in spite of the long history of the theory of subjective probability, nobody seems to have examined the consequences of basing mixed strategies on ‘subjective’ random devices, i.e. devices on the probabilities of whose outcomes people may disagree (such as horse races, elections, etc.).

Suggested by In Game Theory, No Clear Path to Equilibrium by Erica Klarreich (Quanta Magazine)